In a number of his lesser-known federalist essays, Tench Coxe pivoted from his usual focus on the division of powers between state and federal governments to tackle various Anti-Federalist arguments. He highlighted the futility of satisfying disparate objections and emphasized the potential economic and political consequences of disunion for states like Virginia and New York.
In May of 1788, Coxe wrote two essays under the pen name “An American: To the Virginia Convention,” focusing heavily on the negative consequences of disunion that would result from Virginia rejecting ratification.
In a letter to James Madison, he said he wrote the essays because once the “highly important” state ratified, the adoption of the Constitution would be assured, but if Virginia, “should reject the government it will be rendered extremely uncertain in New York, New Hampshire and North Carolina.”
He told Madison his observations were “not so much on the Constitution itself as on its relation to the Prosperity of Virginia & the United States.”
In these two essays, Coxe argued that Virginia would suffer consequences if it failed to ratify, rhetorically asking, “What particular benefits then can Virginia reasonably expect from that dissolution of the confederacy, which must follow the rejection of the proposed plan?”
He asserted that the failure of the Constitution would lead to “partial confederacies,” putting Virginia at a disadvantage because, “The various parts of the North-American continent are formed by nature for the most intimate union.”
He also pointed out that “the capacities of some parts of America are admirably adapted to supply the wants of others.” For example, New England didn’t have much iron or grain, but it could be supplied by the middle states.
As a result, Coxe argued that if Virginia wasn’t part of the union, it would stifle its economic growth.
“Were we to suppose for a moment that Virginia had rejected the proposed Constitution, and that Georgia, South Carolina and Maryland were members of the new confederacy, the agricultural interest of Virginia would be exceedingly injured.”
He summed up his argument at the opening of the first essay.
“Should a ninth state ratify in the Constitution after you have declined to do so, it will become a binding compact- an operative system. The American states would deeply regret a circumstance, that should place a most respectable member of the present union, and a natural born elder sister, in the character of an alien.”
Coxe went on to assert that “our distracted politics” and “the feebleness of our general government” under the Articles of Confederation hindered the United States from becoming “a nation of great respectability and power.”
One of the top reasons was a lack of willing trade partners under the current circumstances.
He pointed out that “foreign powers openly declare their unwillingness to trade with us while our affairs remain on the present footing,” and that other countries knew, “We have not the constitutional powers to execute our own desires, even within our own dominions.”
Coxe noted that other nations saw that the United States possessed the means of “private happiness and national importance” But they also saw “that these inestimable properties of the Americans and their dominions were not brought into any use, from the defects of our political arrangements and the enormous abuses in our administration.”
Given those realities, Coxe implored the Virginia delegates to, “Consider then, in the event of your rejection, in what condition we will be left – into what a situation we may be thrown,” adding that 13 “jarring” sovereignties, or two or three contending confederacies, or a feeble union “will be miserable and hopeless alternatives.”
Yet, he closed with a level of confidence
“The Convention of Virginia will never be instrumental in bringing such evils on the United States. No. – We will confidently hope that those among you, who do not altogether approve the proposed government will yet concur in the measure to save their country from anarchy and ruin.”
In the second essay published a few days later, Coxe returned to the consequences Virginia would face if it didn’t ratify.
He expounded on the potential economic fallout he highlighted in the first essay, pointing out that without the union, they would be exposed to higher tariffs.
“If your workman cannot vend their commodities in other states without meeting the foreign impost, which will fall on all articles not of the growth or manufacturer of the union, it will operate exceedingly to discourage them.”
Coxe speculated that if it remained outside the union, Virginia could be cut off from trade with the Indian tribes and navigation along America’s rivers. It would also be “a shock to public and private credit at home and abroad.”
He also argued that Virginia itself could be split apart due to its geography.
He noted that the people of the “Eastern Shore counties” would find themselves “separated from the rest of the state by a great bay.”
“They would be particularly exposed to the fleets of the union and of foreigners, were they not to join the new confederacy. … Whether they would remain with Virginia under these circumstances or unite with Maryland and the union seems to be a question deserving your serious reflections.”
Then Coxe asserted that “similar considerations could influence other parts of the state to secede from Virginia.”
One solution would be for Virginia to form a smaller confederation with neighboring states such as North Carolina, but Coxe said this would also be fraught with peril because Virginia would be “constrained to give up considerable points.”
Coxe wrapped up this particular argument with an analogy.
“America, in the deplorable event of the rejection of the federal Constitution, will be like an hopeless victim whom justice has subjected to the rack. She will resemble one of those pitiable objects in the disjointed condition of her members.”
And he insisted that however pleasing disunion may be to individuals, “there is no proof of its being the wish of a single county in the union.”
“A little reflection will shew it to be as inconsistent with our happiness and interest, as it is opposite to the wishes and feelings of the people.”
He then pivoted to address one specific Anti-federalist argument – that “officers of the federal government won’t give up power once they possess it.”
Coxe insisted this wasn’t a problem because the states could call a convention to amend the Constitution.
“Congress cannot therefore hold any power, which three-fourths of the states shall not approve on experience.”
So, why not add the necessary amendments before ratification?
Coxe offers six reasons that amendments should wait.
- Circumstances rule out a delay in ratification
- A new convention won’t have any more regard for “the general interest” of the people than the last.
- The objections to the Constitution are too varied to nail down specific amendments.
- Seven states have already ratified
- The number of states already ratifying “is a strong proof that the convention have not mistaken the feelings, opinion and interests of the people.”
- It will be easier to amend after ratification than before.
Coxe wrapped up the essay by asserting that the government “given to the free citizens of America” under the proposed Constitution would be “truly a government of the people, for no man can be excluded from giving his voice, or from holding the offices which are necessary to execute it.”
Power, Coxe insisted, “is vested where I trust it will ever remain, IN THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES.”
Coxe brought all of his many arguments in support of the Constitution together in a June 1788 essay addressed to the New York ratifying convention under the pen name “A Pennsylvanian.” He covered much of the same ground as in his earlier essays under the same name, including the limited nature of the federal government, the safeguards built into the legislature, and the dangers of disunion.
He included a detailed examination of the House and Senate contrasting it with the British Parliament, and an abbreviated list of powers the federal government could not exercise.
Coxe also expanded on an argument he introduced in his second essay of An American insisting that the states could ultimately control the power of government through the amendment process.
He noted that “the federal legislature cannot effect dangerous alterations, which they might desire,” nor can it stop “wholesome alterations and amendments” desired by the people of the states.
Coxe also advanced similar arguments as he did in essays addressed to the Virginia ratifying convention, pointing out that a failure to enact the Constitution would ultimately harm New York.
He wrote that rejecting ratification in New York would likely lead to smaller competing confederations. Specifically, Coxe speculated that Connecticut and New Jersey would collude to “secure a share of your imposts, in proportion to the consumption of your imports.”
He also pointed out that being excluded from the union would put New York at a significant economic disadvantage, arguing that New York merchants “will find it impossible to contend with the embarrassment that must ensue, should New York become a foreign port.”
Coxe also penned some shorter essays addressing specific topics.
Writing as “One of the People” on October 17, 1787, Coxe urged the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention to adopt the constitution, with a heavy emphasis on the potential benefits to the economy through the power to regulate trade. Here, he also discussed substantive limitations on the powers of the federal government, specifically regarding freedom of the press and trials by jury. He emphasized that any powers not delegated to the federal government would remain with the states:
“The freedom of the press and trials by jury are not infringed on. The Constitution is silent, and with propriety too, on these and every other subject relative to the internal government of the states. These are secured by the different state constitutions. I repeat again, that the Federal Constitution does not interfere with these Matters.”
The most unique essay was published by the Pennsylvania Gazette in January 1788 under the pen name Philanthropos.
Instead of taking on specific Anti-Federalist arguments, Coxe pointed out that there were so many that it would be impossible to ever satisfy them all.
“When we observe how much the several gentlemen of the late Convention, who declined to sign the federal constitution, differ in their ground of opposition, we must see how improbable it is, that another convention would unite in the same degree in any plan.”
Coxe went on to compare the objections to the Constitution voiced by three delegates to the Philadelphia Convention who refused to sign it.
“Col. Mason and Mr. Gerry complain of the want of a bill of rights; Governor Randolph does not even mention it as desirable, much less as necessary. Col. Mason objects to the powers of Congress to raise an army; Governor Randolph and Mr. Gerry make no objections on this point, but the former seems to think a militia an inconvenient and uncertain dependence, which is contrary to our opinions in Pennsylvania.”
He then pointed out that, “The minority of the Pennsylvania convention [who voted against ratification], on the other hand, differ from all these gentlemen.”
Given that “the objections severally made by the three honorable gentlemen and the Pennsylvania Minority are so different, and even discordant in their essential principles,” how can there ever be a “greater unanimity of opinion, either in another convention, or in the people?
In these essays, Tench Coxe offered a robust defense of the proposed Constitution, highlighting the impracticality of satisfying every Anti-Federalist objection and emphasizing what he saw as the dire consequences of disunion. Coxe’s arguments underscored the economic and political vulnerabilities that states like Virginia and New York could face outside the union.
By tackling the diversity of concerns – from the fear of an overpowerful federal government to the specter of fractured confederacies – Coxe painted a compelling picture of the Constitution as a necessary framework for advancing economic prosperity and preserving the liberties of the people.
